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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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EXCISE

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PAGE 01 KUWAIT 00904 230800Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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S E C R E T KUWAIT 904

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: LIBYAN COUP'S IMPACT ON KUWAIT

1. [redacted] B1EB/ED

2. SHOCK AND RECOVERY. LONG BEFORE OVERTHROW SENUSSI RULE, EDUCATED KUWAITIS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT CONVULSIONS LIBYA MIGHT ONE DAY UNDERGO, CONSIDERING KING'S AGE AND LACK COMPETENT SUCCESSOR. IN EARLY SEPTEMBER GOK LEADERSHIP ASSUMED CALM

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SECRET

PAGE 02 KUWAIT 00904 230800Z

BUT HIGHLY INTERESTED ATTITUDE TOWARD NEWS FROM LIBYA. DEEP INTEREST EVIDENCED BY FACT EVERY CABINET MEMBER VISITED BY UK AMBASSADOR (JUST BACK FROM 3 MONTH HOLIDAY) VOLUNTEERED LIBYA INTO CONVERSATION. ALSO GOK INFORMALLY SOUGHT TO GLEAN FROM BRITS EVERY AVAILABLE SCRAP OF INFO, WHICH WASNOT MUCH, ON HAPPENINGS IN TRIPOLI/BENGHAZI. BY MID-MONTH, RELATIVELY MILD PRONOUNCEMENTS BY RCC PROVED WELCOME TONIC. UNDERSTAND CP JABIR AL-AHMAD TOLD UK AMB WEEK OR SO AGO THAT NOW WAS BETTER TIME FOR LIBYAN REVOLUTION THAN ON KING IDRIS' DEATH. NOTING GOK'S RELIEF AT RATHER MODERATE RCC STATEMENTS COMING FROM LIBYA, JABIR SAID GOK'S MAIN HOPE WAS THAT STABILITY WOULD ENSUE RATHER THAN SAPPING AND WORRISOME IRAQI-TYPE PATTERN OF COUP, COUNTER-COUP, ETC.

[redacted] B1E B/ED

5. GOK LEADERSHIP SEEMS ON TOP OF SITUATION. IF WITHIN SABAH RANKS THERE EXIST ANY SERIOUS DIFFERENCES OF SCOPE THAT WOULD INVITE POTENTIAL SUBVERSIVES OR ARMY REVOLUTIONARIES TO GAIN FOOTHOLD IN COUNTRY, THIS IS WELL-KEPT SECRET. [redacted] B1E D

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SECRET

PAGE 03 KUWAIT 00904 230800Z

THROUGHOUT STATE ESTABLISHMENT BY MEANS PATRONAGE OF KEY FAMILIES, VARIOUS TIE-INS TO COMMERCIAL SECTOR, AND DISPERSAL OF JOBS AND FAVORS TO TRIBAL GROUPS. LIBERAL SALARY AND FRINGE BENEFITS EXTEND TO ALL KUWAITI CITIZEN SECTORS, AND POVERTY POCKETS USUALLY EMBARRASSING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ALL BUT NONEXISTENT WITH EXCEPTION HANDFUL OF NON-KUWAITI ELEMENTS. (THIS TRUE TO FAR GREATER DEGREE HERE THAN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND, WE SUPPOSE, LIBYA.) SMALL YIZE OF CITY-STATE KUWAIT IS STILL ANOTHE FACTOR ASSISTING SABAHS KEEP FIRM GRIP ON KUWAITI PULSE AND ACCURATE TABS ON POTENTIAL DISSIDENTS.

6. CURRENT IMAGE OF VIGIALNCE. GOK DETERMINATION KEEP FIRM GRIP INTERNALLY BEING PUBLICIZED DAILY THROUGH WIDE VERBAL AND PHOTO COVERAGE STATE SECURITY COURT TRIALS OF 21 ACCUSED SUBVERSIVES FROM LAST JANUARY'S EXPLOSIVES EPISODE. TRIALS OPENED SEPT. 16 AFTER SUMMER-LONG PREPARATIONS. STRICTER IMMIGRATION/RESIDENCE PROCEDURES INSTITUTED LAST SPRING ADDED ANOTHER "NO NONSENSE" DIMENSION TO REPUTATION SABAH LEADERSHIP, THOUGH THEIR EFFECTIVENESS DOUBTLESS LESS THAN GOK WOULD WISH.

7. CONCLUSIONS. CLEARLY, POST-1967 TREND TOWARD MORE RADICAL NATIONALISM IN ARAB WORLD AND INCREASING ISOLATION OF ARAB MODERATES HAVE PROMOTED CLOSER SABAH ATTENTION TO EFFICIENCY THEIR INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS. TREPIDATION AT WHAT 1971 UK EXODUS FROM GULF MAY MEAN IN SECURITY TERMS ADDS TO THIS CONCERN, INDEED MAY HAVE PROMPTED IT.



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8. NON-KUWAITI MAJORITY OF CONTRY'S POPULATION SPLIT INTO SEVERAL GROUPS.

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PAGE 04 KUWAIT 00904 230800Z

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NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.